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WHY DOES UTILITARIANISM SEEM
PLAUSIBLE?
I shall be discussing Utilitarian approaches to
ethics, understood as claiming that morality
requires us (when deciding what to do) to
always choose that action which would have
the best (or at least reasonabl y good) overall
consequences when compared with any other
possible actions one could perform in a given
situation.
This general kind of Utilitarianism (U.) is well
entrenched in ethics. Though endlessly
attacked on moral grounds, such attacks on U.
can never be conclusive by themselves. The
problem for opponents at a theoretical level is
that justifying actions in terms of the benefits
associated with their consequences seems
generally to be a defensible form of moral
reasoning. And a main reason why the U.
consequentialist approach to ethics (in one
form or another) has been at or near' center
stage' in ethics since its inception is because it
is the only systematic and generally-known
consequentialist ethical theory.
---------- 1 ----------
Hence, those who wish to refute or undermine
U. approaches to ethics have several
substantial tasks on their hands. First, ideally
some disqualifying or crippling ethical or
methodological problems would be found in
U. itself, sufficient to permanently discredit it.
But this alone would not be sufficient, because
there is still the problem of how to explain (or
explain away) in non-U. terms the many
common consequentialist patterns of reasoning
in ethics.
More specifically, there is the problem of how
to explain those cases of apparently U.
reasoning which do seem to be plausible. Even
if U. reasoning generally is highly suspect or
discredited, U. will persist to 'save' those
plausible cases unless some more adequate
theory is able to co-opt or reinterpret those
cases in non-U. terms.
I am one of those attempting both to refute U.
approaches, and to provide some more
adequate account of consequentialist thinking
in ethics. However, I should emphasize that
this is very much work in progress, which is
controversial and too recent to have received
---------- 2 ----------
much attention or discussion in the profession
as yet.
As one might expect, this work arises out of
some pervasive dissatisfactions of mine with
standard U. theories. I have recently argued
that such theories are, by rigorous standards,
conceptually incoherent and empirically
impossible.l The reasons for the incoherence
and impossibility of U. center round the
completely intractable problems of defining or
verifying a set of consequences of an action,
and the related problems of assigning values or
utilities to all events so that each event in such
a set of consequences would have a definite
value assignment.
In another recent work, I present an
alternative, non-Utilitarian meta-ethical theory
which is broadly consequentialist and which
hence could potentially serve as a replacement
for the discredited U. theories.2 The general
idea is that a morally good society would be
one in which we try to reconcile in an
optimum manner all of the conflicting interests
of people. This activity will generally have
good consequences, but other values besides
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consequentialist ones will be relevant to
judging it as well.
A third paper specifically deals with the
theoretical issues of defining a non-U.
consequentialism, and contrasting it with the
U. kind.3 In it I note that in the U.
consequentialist model, the values of
consequences are assumed to be fixed and
independent of any moral theorizing.
However, it is also possible to view
consequences and their values as being partly
dependent on moral theorizing in a broad
sense (including the development of moral
attitudes and interests in a person as part of
their moral theorizing), which leads to an
alternative conception of consequences
avoiding many of the difficulties of the U.
concept.
In this current paper I start on the tasks of
specific diagnosis and replacement of U.
consequentialist forms of reasoning. To
simplify things I shall consider only arguments
which seem to me to have at least some kind
of initial plausibility, and hence to deserve re-
interpretation rather than outright rejection.
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This should allow me freer rein in initial
criticism, with less suspicion of personal
malice or bias, since I shall be among those
who have to clean up any resultant mess.
Before proceeding, and to avoid any
misunderstandings, I should make clear that
my criticisms of U. consequentialist reasoning
are not a general criticism of all kinds of
means/ends reasoning. For example, it is
sometimes innocuous to select one or more
specific desired ends, and then attempt to work
out an effective means of achieving each of
them. There is nothing specifically U. about
such common instrumentalist patterns of
reasoning. But note that even here, if claims
were made about the best (rather than merely
an effective) means of achieving a goal,
similar U.-style problems could arise.4
I shall mainly confine myself to examining a
few schematic kinds of U. arguments, since
my emphasis will be on general procedures for
translating such arguments rather than on the
specifics of each argument. Also, as someone
who finds the same few deadly flaws in all U.
arguments, I cannot be expected to muster
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much enthusiasm for what others might
consider to be the 'rich variety' of U.
reasoning.
In my first paper mentioned above
("Foundational Flaws in Utilitarianism,") I
pointed out that since U. itself was
fundamentally incoherent and impossible, the
only hope for 'saving' U. reasoning was to
reinterpret it within some other framework.
Perhaps a useful way to start on this is to
show some of the specific ways in which the
incoherence/impossibility problems undermine
the U. status of some standard kinds of U.
argument, and hence show a specific need for
reinterpretation in their case.
Let us then start with ways in which the
impossibility of adequately defining a set of U.
consequences shows up as a problem about the
status of any supposedly U. 'consequences' we
are told about. For example, consider the U.
argument that capitalism ought to be pursued
in preference to socialism, because capitalist
economies produce the best (or, better)
consequences.
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Perhaps it is fairly clear in this case that the
methodological and epistemological problems
concerning such a claim are formidable
indeed. A scientifically respectable
comparison of capitalist versus socialist
economies would require large-scale social
experiments in which carefully controlled
initial conditions, along with capitalist versus
socialist factors in each kind of economy, were
allowed to develop over sufficiently long
periods of time. Also, somehow the
economies would have to be kept synchronized
or structurally related so that consequences of
each could meaningfully be compared.
Self-defeating prohibitions and requirements
might also be unavoidable, with requirements
of strong control to prevent external or internal
interference with the experiment (e.g., no free
votes allowing basic changes within a society
during the experiment) with a simultaneous
prohibition on such interference as potentially
resulting in a systematic distortion of any
results.
Since the world community has not and
perhaps could not conduct any such
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experiments, what possible right do we have to
claim to possess reliable consequentialist
evidence about capitalism versus socialism,
when we know that such evidence could only
adequately be'validated and confirmed by such
means?
I think that this is a very good question, so
good indeed that the only hope for salvaging
anything of the initial plausibility of the U.
argument lies in a quite radical reinterpretation
of the supposed evidence. But before
providing such a reinterpretation, let me bring
in another dimension of the problem about the
consequentialist evidence.
This other dimension concerning the
identification and validation of a set of
consequences is connected with the logical
issue of completeness. Even if the specific
consequences directly concerning capitalism
and socialism were validated, there is always
the possibility that other consequences might
obtrude themselves and have such an
overwhelming effect that they would ruin the
initial calculations. (This might be called the
'indirect extreme consequence' problem.)
---------- 8 ----------
It has actually been suggested that such an
indirect extreme consequence may be lurking
in our own near future (in this case, a
catastrophic one). Various people, including
ecologists, have suggested that the very
capitalistic successes of our world economy
could in their tum doom us to extinction
through rapid growth and irreversible pollution
problems, so that after all (if this were true)
capitalism would not have better consequences
(overall) than socialism.
The epistemological problems of U. which
these points illustrate are unending. No matter
how many consequences of an action we
consider, it is always perfectly possible that
some further, as yet unconsidered consequence
(or consequences) may radically change the
overall utility of previously-considered
consequences. Therefore it is never rational to
give the slightest credence to initial or
tentative calculations of utility for a set of
consequences. Hence U. calculations are
completely useless as a tentative guide to
action, just as they are epistemically
impossible as a finished, non-tentative guide to
what we ought to do.
---------- 9 ----------
Overall, then, there are two separate groups of
U. problems with the typical large-scale social
issues (such as capitalism versus socialism, or
other matters of public policy) on which
Utilitarians prIde themselves as having
something worthwhile to say. Their claims
about the particular consequences they are
interested in are typically unclear and
scientifically disreputable or naive, while in
the perspective of history their claims are
doomed to irrelevance because they are based
on only a tiny portion of the potential
consequential evidence.
'SAVING' THE PLAUSIBLE ASPECTS
OF A U. POSITION
What then can be done to 'save' some
plausible aspects or evidence from the U.
claims in such a case? Let me make it clear
from the start that I shall not claim that any
Utilitarian actually meant or intended, nor that
the U. claim itself actually means, what I shall
suggest is the 'plausible core' of the original
U. claim in such a case. Rather my attempt is
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to 'rescue' any real value that there might be
in an appeal to consequences in such a case,
by using a much circumscribed concept of a
'consequence' which is free from the
disastrous U. implications.
In order to perform the rescue, the U. kind of
consequentialism must be re-interpreted using
a different model of consequences. The main
distinction in my third paper cited above
("Theory-Relative Consequentialism in
Ethics") is intended to facilitate this re-
interpretation. I claim that in addition to the
U. consequentialist model, in which values of
consequences are fixed and independent of any
moral theorizing, it is also possible to view
consequences and their values as being partly
dependent on moral theorizing in a broad
sense (including the development of moral
attitudes and interests in a person as part of
their moral theorizing).
For example, a commitment to justice as part
of one's 'moral theory' could legitimately lead
one to discount or ignore a course of action
producing the greatest average amount of
benefit, if the distribution of benefits itself was
---------- 11 ----------
unjust. Yet one's concerns could still be
largely consequentialist (in a non-U., modified
sense), in that good consequences (consistent
with one's theorizing) would still play an
important part in one's decision as to what to
do.
Here then is an outline of a procedure for
reinterpreting initial U. claims within a moral-
theory-relative consequentialist structure.
Recall that strictly speaking, U. consequences
cannot offer support to any thesis whatsoever.
So our overall task is to find some appropriate
non-U. general moral framework, relative to
which an adapted and limited form of the
supposed consequences could after all support
some thesis related to the original U. thesis.
An initial suggestion for arriving at an
appropriate moral framework is as follows.
Take the broadest distinction or thesis
advocated by the original U. claim (e.g., that
capitalism has better consequences than
socialism). Choose as the required moral
framework some framework which is
reasonably congenial with or supportive of the
position or thesis advocated. (For example,
---------- 12 ----------
political libertarianism.)
Consider then, not any actual or potential
consequences of capitalism whatsoever, but
only very specific phenomena which could be
taken to support or confirm (or, not support or
disconfirm) the moral theory in question. For
example, evidence that some capitalists
become much richer or acquire an increasing
range of choices would support the theory,
whereas the lack of such evidence, or contrary
evidence, would tend to disconfirm the theory.
Clearly such consequences deserve to be called
'theory-relative', because their goodness,
badness and importance largely depend upon
the moral theory being used to interpret them.
At the same time, such consequences are also
free of the crippling epistemological problems
of U. consequences. This is because their
value is defined relative to the moral theory
rather than having to be associated with some
overall set of consequences (as in the U. case).
Thus these theory-relative consequences have a
definite value whether or not some
catastrophic indirect consequences lurk around
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the temporal corner.
We have almost arrived at the final translation
of the original claim (that capitalism has better
consequences than socialism). It will be
differently interpreted by supporters of each
position. The claim is true just in case, and to
the extent that, the appropriate moral theory
(either that of capitalism or socialism) is
supported by evidence which counts as
relevant, relative to the assumed theory.
Note however that the initial apparent factual
dispute about which of two systems is best is
lost in the translation. This is as it should be,
because U. forms of reasoning are (as we have
argued) totally unable to show anything
whatsoever about which of two systems has
the 'best consequences'. The only possible
plausible core left is the defence of some
moral point of view, which certain kinds of
consequential evidence may in fact support.
Let me, however, bend over backwards for a
moment in trying to help the U. to 'save' more
here. Perhaps the dispute between capitalism
and socialism could be partly preserved as
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follows. A supporter of capitalism might
have, as part of her reason for adopting a
capitalism-supporting moral theory, a belief
that her total package (a moral theory plus its
consequential support) is a better package as a
whole than that of her rival the socialist, who
adopts a socialism-supporting moral theory
along with its supporting evidence. As long as
the belief that one package is a better package
than the other is held on non-V. grounds, I
would not object to this richer account of the
'plausible core', even though the V. position
itself is unable to justify any such comparative
information.
SOME GENERAL ISSUES
Here are some general issues concerning V.
and such translations. First, it could well be
objected that replacing a claim (e.g., capitalism
has better consequences than socialism) with
one-sided moral assumptions about the value
and relevance of certain kinds of evidence is
tantamount to begging the question, or
ignoring the question, in favor of one's own
view on the question. I largely agree with this
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objection, and it reinforces my point that U.
explanations aren't worth very much (even
when translated into their 'plausible core').
Perhaps we'd be much better off if we
scrapped them entirely.
Second, even in the best of cases (when there
is something definitely worthwhile in the
'plausible core'), the obvious view is that such
a plausible core ought to be advanced as an
explicit, independent theoretical position
supported by some evidence. It should not be
misleadingly packaged in the U. way using
scientifically and logically naive concepts such
as that of 'all the consequences' of an action.
There may also be some interesting
implications for ethics teaching for those who
agree that the U. approach is fundamentally
flawed. If it is, the teaching of U. in ethics
courses as a serious theory might come to be
regarded as having a similar dubious status to
the teaching of "creation science" in science
courses. Of course, any ethical theory, no
matter how crazy, may have some pedagogical
value for critical discussion and dissection, but
under the present approach it would be
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relegated to the category of tempting fallacies,
along with such things as popular conceptions
of egoism or relativism (which usually turn out
to be an unstable and confused mixture of
conflicting factual and evaluative claims).
This is a good point at which to recall the
purposes of this paper. Even those who share
my uncompromising views about U. should be
concerned to distinguish legitimate from
illegitimate forms of consequential ism in
ethics, and be concerned to preserve and
explain what there may be of moral substance
in arguments even when they occur as part of
a discredited U. framework. There is also the
point that intuitions are stubborn, and if not
respected and explained they will tend to
preserve the framework which gave them
birth, no matter how little independent rational
support there is for that framework.
BROADER KINDS OF
CONSEQUENTIALIST REASONING
The problems raised and translations suggested
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in U. cases must now be briefly extended to
more general forms of consequentialist
reasoning in ethics. U. is usually specifically
identified with those kinds of consequentialism
in which some maximization principle such as
the Principle of Utility is invoked. ("Choose
that action which has the greatest utility", we
might be told.) However, the deep flaws in U.
to which attention has been drawn are flaws in
its most basic idea of a set of consequences to
each member of which values are assigned.
So the flaws are sufficient to undermine any
consequentialist assumptions using such a
concept, even without the traditional
maximization assumption.
For example, if someone were to claim that
the institutions and practices of modem
societies overall are morally acceptable or
legitimate, on the grounds that generally they
are good for members of our species, I hope
that we can agree that on a careful, accurate
interpretation of this as a standard
consequentialist claim, this is as close to
meaningless as ethical claims can get. Even
without a maximization claim (optimality is
not claimed, but only acceptability), a chaotic
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set of consequences must somehow be defined
linking modern societies, what is good for
members of our species, some totally
unspecified time-frame, the usual threat of
secondary consequences which could ruin or
change everything, and so on.
Yet as usual the claim seems to have some
intuitive foundation and so calls for
reinterpretation rather than total dismissal.
Rather than invoke something as formal or
substantial as a moral theory, let me suggest
that in such cases one or more 'moral
explanation sketches' might be invoked to
explain what is going on.
A 'moral explanation sketch' is some informal,
schematic way of tying together some
fragment of a moral theory with some relevant
theory-relative consequences. If the expected
consequences apply then they explain or
support the moral theory fragment. For
example, here is how to construct an
explanation sketch in the present case. Pick
some specific aspect of modem life (such as
availability of educational opportunities), think
of circumstances in which it is potentially
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good for humans, then more concretely
imagine consequences which fulfil that
potential for good. If this overall picture or
sketch is confirmed (if there actually are some
such theory-relative consequences), then to this
extent some truth has been found in the
original claim.
It seems likely that in the present case, many
different sketches might be required to fully
account for the full meaning or implications of
the original claim. Here then is another useful
translation principle: break up the old, totally
intractable claim into several more limited
theory-relative claims. This could even give us
some kind of measure of the extent to which
the original claim was true: the ratio of
successful to unsuccessful explanation-sketches
could provide us with the desired measure.
CONCLUSION
Though this paper has been presented as part
of an ongoing effort to expose and defuse U.
arguments, its more positive contributions in
attempting to initially identify and support
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some theory-relative consequentialist
arguments are much more important in the
long run. Some of us hope that U. will be
'here today and gone tomorrow', but the
whole world of non-Utilitarian, legitimate
consequentialist reasoning in ethics will still
remain to be discovered and articulated.
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NOTES
1. John B. Dilworth, "Foundational Flaws in
Utilitarianism," submitted for publication.
2. John B. Dilworth, "Ethics as the Pursuit of
Optimal Compatibility of Interests",
submitted for publication.
3. John B. Dilworth, "Theory-Relative
Consequentialism in Ethics," submitted for
publication.
4. In my "Why Utilitarianism Can't Handle
Self-Interest," submitted for publication, I
show how the problems could arise in any
attempt to calculate the 'best' actions to
'maximize' one's self-related interests.
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